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Abstract—  Authentication is the process of determining whether 
someone or something is, in fact, who or what they are declared to be.  
The authentication process uses credentials  (claims)  containing 
authentication information within one of many possible authentication 
protocols to establish the identities of the parties that wish to 
collaborate.  Claims are representations that are provided by a trusted 
entity and can be verified and validated.  Of the many authentication 
protocols, including self-attestation, username/password and 
presentation of credentials, only the latter can be treated as claims.   
This is a key aspect of our enterprise solution, in that all active entities 
(persons, machines, and services) are credentialed and the 
authentication is bi-lateral, that is, each entity makes a claim to the 
other entity in every communication session initiated.  This paper 
describes authentication that uses the TLS protocols primarily since 
these are the dominant protocols above the transport layer on the 
Internet. Other higher layer protocols,  such as WS-Security, WS-
Federation and WS-Trust,  that use a Public  Key  Infrastructure 
credential for authentication, integrate via middleware.  This 
authentication is claims based and is a part of an enterprise level 
security solution that has been piloted and is undergoing operational 
standup.  
Keywords- authentication; Public Key Infrastructure; Claims-based 
Identity;  Web services;  Transport Layer Security; Bi-lateral 
authentication. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Authentication  is  a  system function that establishes a 
level of confidence in the truth of a claim (e.g., a user’s 
identity or the source and integrity of data). The 
authentication process includes the presentation of a 
credential, validation of the credential, proof of the claimed 
binding, determination of authentication assurance level 
(includes multiple factors), and the completion  of the 
authentication decision  by the establishment of a 
communications channel with the identity. 
II.  ACTIVE ENTITIES IN THE ENTERPRISE CONTEXT 
Entities within the enterprise environment may be active 
or passive.  Passive entities include information packages, 
static files,  and  reference data structures.   They are the 
target of activities. They do not initiate activities and cannot 
provide the role of requestor or provider.  Active entities are 
those entities that change or modify passive entities, request 
or provide services, or participate in communication flows.  
Active entities are users, hardware, and services.  All active 
entities in  the  enterprise  have DoD certificates, and their 
private keys are stored in tamper-proof, threat-mitigating 
storage.  Communication between active entities in the 
enterprise requires full bi-lateral, Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI), end-to-end authentication [2, 4a, 6b].   
____________________________________ 
Manuscript received February 11, 2013; revised March 26, 2013. This 
work was supported in part by the U.S. Secretary of the Air Force and The 
Institute for Defense Analyses.  The publication of this paper does not 
indicate endorsement by the US DoD or IDA, nor should the contents be 
construed as reflecting the official position of these organizations  
Coimbatore Chandersekaran is with the Institute for Defense 
Analyses.(email: cchander@ida.org) 
William R. Simpson is with the Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark 
Center Drive, Alexandria, Va. 22311 USA and is the corresponding author 
phone: 703-845-6637, FAX: 703-845-6848 (e-mail: rsimpson@ida.org)         
Active entities must be named in accordance with DoD 
Naming instruction [1].  Authentication in the enterprise 
environment is implemented as  a verifiable claims-based 
attestation process.  Figure 1 displays two active entities 
performing authentication and Active Entity B retrieving 
content from a passive entity.   
 
Figure 1 Communication between Active Entities 
III.  CREDENTIALING IN THE ENTERPRISE CONTEXT 
A credential is a claim (in this case of identity) that can 
be verified as accurate and current.  Credentials must be 
provided for all active entities that are established in the 
enterprise in order to perform authentication.  Prior 
registration as an active entity with a confirmable entity 
name is required.   The forms of credentials in use include 
certificates, Kerberos tickets, and hardware tokens.  The 
details of generating, escrowing/retrieval, distributing, 
validating, and revoking certificates are discussed  in 
specifications for DoD Certificates.  Users are issued 
hardware tokens (Common Access Cards [CAC]) that have 
DoD Certificates stored on them with the private keys 
stored in hardware on the card.  Machines and services are 
issued software certificates that contain the public key with 
the private key generated and remaining  in hardware 
storage modules. 
IV.  AUTHENTICATION IN THE ENTERPRISE CONTEXT 
Authentication is responsible for establishing the identity 
of an entity.  Authentication is achieved by receiving, 
validating,  and verifying the identity credential.  For 
certificates, validation is achieved by encrypting a message 
with the private key of the requester and transmitting it to 
the provider.  The provider can then validate that it was sent 
by the requester by decrypting it with the requester’s public 
key.  This assures that the requester is the holder of the 
private key.  Verification is achieved by verifying the trusted 
agent that issued the certificate, this authentication is two-
way (the requestor authenticates the provider and the 
provider authenticates the requestor). 
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A. Certificate Credentials 
The  required  credential  for enterprise personnel is an 
enterprise-issued X.509 (currently version 2.1), RSA-based 
certificate.  X.509 certificates are used to bind an entity 
name to a public key in the PKI and to hold additional 
attributes (such as organizational unit data, and other data 
encoded in the distinguished name (DN)).  They are used by 
authentication and authorization services, digital signing, 
and other cryptographic functions.  Enterprise certificate 
credentials for users must be obtained through designated 
trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs).  The CA provides the 
enterprise PKI credentials for users, devices, and services.  
Certificate credentials contain non-secret  (publicly 
available) information.   A hardware token that contains the 
certificate is preferred to software-only certificates.   For 
enterprise  users,  the  method of credential storage is an 
enterprise-issued card with a highly secure tamper-proof 
hardware store, which is FIPS 140-2 level 2 validated for 
cryptographic tokens.    
 
Software certificates (used in addition to hardware 
tokens)  are  in the PKCS#12  [2]  formats and must be 
installed in certificate storage associated with the entity that 
owns the certificate or its host device (which must also be 
credentialed).  A user may have a software certificate issued 
by a designated CA that is installed in certificate storage in 
the user’s host device.  For devices and services that are 
established in the enterprise, a software certificate is 
acquired from a designated CA and is installed in certificate 
storage on the device itself and on the host device. [For 
hardware elements outside the enterprise, PKCS#12 files 
may be maintained as backup offline -  but, in general, 
should not be stored on the hardware device attached to the 
network.]  The certificate credential for an entity must 
contain the enterprise-unique and persistent identifier in the 
certificate subject DN field; for users this is the extended 
common name; for devices and services this is  the 
Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) in accordance with 
the enterprise naming standard. 
B.  Registration 
The  registration  function  is a service that creates and 
maintains the information about the identities of entities in 
the enterprise.  There are three main issues to consider as 
discussed below: 
 
1)  Kerberos Tickets  
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol originally 
developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
and now documented in several Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) Internet Drafts and RFCs  [6f].   Kerberos 
tickets are used with enterprise  Active Directory (AD) 
forests.   
 
2)  Authentication and Attribute Assertion Tokens 
Once authentication is established, the attributes of the 
identities are used to produce authorization claims.  The 
primary method for expressing authorization claims in the 
enterprise  uses  derived credentials based on attribute 
assertion tokens at the message layer.  These tokens contain 
security assertions and are obtained from a Security Token 
Service  (STS).  These  tokens  are  based on the Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML)  (current version) 
standard [3f].  The use of SAML tokens in this context is 
discussed in [21].    Although the standard allows for 
authentication elements in the SAML token, they are not 
used in this formulation.  SAML is used only for 
authorization,  and the only link to authentication is the 
binding to the requester by a holder-of-key (HOK) check 
(see [22] for the definition of this check and how it is 
performed). 
   
3)  Interoperability of Credentials 
Public key cryptography  depends on the ability to 
validate certificates against a trusted source.  The  use of 
PKI is discussed in [9].    External information sharing 
includes authentication based upon a federation agreement 
that specifies  approved primary and derived credentials.  
The credentials will be configured for such federations. 
C.  Authentication 
The  enterprise supports  two general methods for 
authentication: Kerberos-based and Direct PKI.       
Authentication relies on certificates.    
 
1)  Devices and Services Authentication PKI 
Devices and Services  are  configured to authenticate 
themselves to the identity provider of the enterprise using 
bi-lateral  Transport Layer Security (TLS)  [6a].    The 
authentication relies on enterprise-issued PKI certificates 
 
2)  User Initial Authentication to the Domain 
The user authenticates  using the PKI-enabled logon 
program, which asks the user for a passcode that is, in turn, 
used as an index to a  Kerberos key.  This is a hybrid 
approach where the hardware token is read and user 
ownership is sought by presenting an input screen for the 
passcode associated with the hardware token.  PKINIT is 
invoked, completing the authentication by PKI (Kerberos 
supports both password based user authentication and PKI 
based principal authentication with the PKINIT extension) 
using the certificate stored on the card.    The Kerberos-
based authentication uses the PKINIT and Kerberos 
protocols.  For enterprise operations, users authenticate to 
the Identity Manager with the enterprise hardware token.   
 
The hardware token credential is only used by human 
users, and either soft certificates or certificates stored in 
hardware storage modules are used for other entities. The 
user authenticates  to the domain controller  using a 
smartcard logon program such as  the  CAC or another 
approved active card and authenticates using the hardware 
token and a user-supplied PIN.   The PKI Initiation program 
is invoked completing the authentication by PKI.  External 
users (users communicating from outside the enterprise) are 
then provided a virtual private network (VPN) tunnel and 
treated as if they were within the domain.  Kerberos 
supports both password-based user authentication and PKI-
based principal authentication (with the PKINIT extension).    
Successful completion of the logon procedure signifies 
successful authentication of the user to the domain 
controller  (a  timeout will occur at pre-configured period 
more details are provided in [2]).   
 
3)  User Authentication to Services Using PKI  
It is assumed at this point that the user has successfully 
authenticated to the Identity Manager using PKI.  If the user 
wishes to access any other web service through the web 
Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering 2013 Vol II, 
WCE 2013, July 3 - 5, 2013, London, U.K.
ISBN: 978-988-19252-8-2 
ISSN: 2078-0958 (Print); ISSN: 2078-0966 (Online)
WCE 2013 
browser, he does so using HTTPS.   All entity drivers will 
be configured to use TLS client authentication.   This 
additionally  provides  Transport Layer Confidentiality for 
subsequent message layer traffic over https.  This validates 
the user’s certificate and passes the certificate to the web 
service being accessed.   
 
4)  Service-to-Service Authentications 
Requesters make requests  for capabilities from Web 
services. In all cases, any capability request is preceded by 
TLS client authentication.  Services may request other web 
services for capabilities (service providers).  Services may 
include web services, utility services, and others. 
V.  INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY COMPONENT 
INTERACTION 
Figure 2 shows the basic authentication flows required 
prior to all interactions.  This flow is the basic TLS setup. 
 
When a requester wishes to use another service, there are 
four  active entities that come into play.  Details are 
provided in Figures 3 and 4 - the active entities are listed 
below. 
1.  a. For a user: 
The user (Requester) web browser -- This 
is a standard web browser that can use the 
HTTP and HTTPS drivers (including the 
TLS driver) on the platform. 
b. For a service: 
The requester host platform 
2.  The Security Token Service (STS) in the 
requester’s domain 
3.  The Enterprise Attribute Store 
4.  The requested service (application server) in the 
resource application environment. 
Figure 2 Authentication Flows 
A. Interactions Triggered by a User Request for Service  
The user first makes a request to STS.  Included in that 
request  is  an identifier (the  Uniform Resource Identifier 
(URI)  [6c]) or a token referring to this identifier  of the 
target service.  The STS will generate the SAML credentials 
and return them to the browser with instructions to redirect 
to the service and post  the SAML in this request  to the 
application server (see Figure 3).  If HTTPS messages are 
used,  then bi-lateral authentication takes place  based on 
configuration of the servers and the web browsers.   
B.  Interactions Triggered by a Service Request for Service  
The web service (1) will send a service request to the 
web service (2) as shown in figure 4.  All communications 
shown in this figure are preceded by a bi-lateral 
authentication triggered by an HTTPS message.   
VI.  COMPLIANCE TESTING  
Authentication testing verifies that the bi-lateral PKI-
based authentication  is  working properly in the 
enterprise.  This includes testing TLS on every connection 
in the security flows.  Packet captures are done on nodes in 
the flow and then TLS traffic is checked for certificate 
exchanges and encryption.  Checks for OCSP (the Online 
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is an Internet protocol 
used for obtaining the revocation status of an X.509 digital 
certificate). calls and returns verify that certificate status is 
being checked correctly.  The packet captures are executed 
for a request to the STS.   Authentication testing covers 
revoked and expired certificates.  Captures will show OCSP 
traffic for the revoked certificate. 
 
Figure 3 Web Browser Request for Service Message 
Flows 
 
Figure 4 Web Service Request for Service Message 
Flows 
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VII.  FEDERATED AUTHENTICATION 
Federated communications must meet all of the enterprise 
requirements, including: 
• Naming PKI certificates,  
• Certificates issued by a recognized certificate issuer,  
• Valid, not-revoked, dates,  
• TLS MutualAuth authentication, and  
• SAML tokens from designated authorized STSs that 
meet all of the above requirements. 
A. Naming and Identity 
Identity is established by the enterprise or the requesting 
agency as agreed to in the federation agreement.  In the 
enterprise, this is primarily through the enterprise naming 
contained in the enterprise-issued  X.509.  These names 
should be standardized throughout the enterprise and satisfy 
the property of uniqueness over space and time.  For people, 
this name is the enterprise standardized name, but for other 
certificate authorities, their naming schemes  are accepted 
based on federation agreements.  The identity used by all 
federated exchanges is the Distinguished Name as it appears 
on the primary credential provided by the certificate 
authority.  If there is a collision, mapping of federation 
names will be required. 
Credentials 
Credentials are an integral part of the federation model.  
Each identity requiring access is credentialed by a trusted 
credentialing authority.  Further, the STS  used for 
generating SAML [4a-h] tokens, is also credentialed (as are 
all active entities in the enterprise).  The primary exchange 
medium for setting up authentication of identities and 
setting up cryptographic flows is the PKI embodied in an 
X.509 certificate.  The certificate authority must use known 
and registered (or in specific cases defined) certificate 
revocation and currency-checking software.   
B.  Translation of Claims or Identities 
Identities are translated as indicated in the federation 
agreement.  For simple federation, where requests are 
across the enterprise domains, there is no mapping, as the 
identities are in the appropriate form already.   
C.  Other Issues 
The registering of recognized STS and claim mapping must 
be promulgated in an an enterprise  policy memorandum 
after ratification of the federation agreement.  The 
federation agreement may be an attachment to such a policy 
memorandum.  This memorandum must be distributed to 
the appropriate organization for implementation by the 
Enterprise Attribute Store (EAS) and STS Administrators 
for incorporation in the trusted STS store. This maintains 
the lines of authority.  A more complete discussion of 
federation, including a sample federation agreement is 
provided in [20]. 
VIII.  MATURING GUIDANCE  
Related changes to OASIS, W3C, and IETF standards will 
necessarily be cause to reconsider and possibly modify 
these processes when appropriate.  Because these standards 
tend to be backward compatible, or allow appropriate sunset 
periods, it can be assumed that phased-in implementation of 
changes will take place. 
IX.  SUMMARY 
We have presented an authentication process for identity 
management and bi-lateral authentication between 
requesters and providers in an enterprise environment. The 
enterprise environment providers include web application 
and web services.  The authentication is the beginning of a 
claims-based process that  will include  SAML  claims for 
authorization.  The content delivery process is part of an 
enterprise architecture for high assurance that is web-
service based and driven by commercial standards.  Portions 
of this architecture are described in references [18 – 31]. 
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